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Subnational Value Added Tax in Ethiopia and Implications for States’ 
Fiscal Capacity 
 
Wollela Abehodie Yesegat and Richard Krever 
 
 
Summary 
 
In most federal systems, state governments are funded through a combination of direct fiscal 
transfers from the central government, and the revenue they collect directly from locally 
adopted taxes. Ethiopia is a federal polity, but follows a slightly different path in the case of 
its most important tax source – value added tax (VAT). As is the case in many developing 
countries, VAT is a major source of government revenue in Ethiopia, and the tax is levied 
under central government legislation. However, unlike the more common practice of a central 
government collecting VAT and then earmarking some of the revenue for transfer to states, 
collection rights and administration powers over VAT imposed on a portion of the economy in 
Ethiopia are assigned directly to state governments. The result is a fiscal relationship 
between central and state governments in Ethiopia that is distinctive in three main respects. 
 
First, responsibility for collection of the tax is divided between central and state tax 
administrations, with collection powers allocated on the basis of the legal form of businesses. 
VAT allows businesses to claim credits for VAT paid on acquisitions. A crucial feature of the 
successful administration of VAT is thought to be the unified administration of the tax, so 
claims for credits can be cross-checked against remittances from sales. The division of 
responsibilities in Ethiopia, and limited channels of communication between branch offices of 
state administrations and the central tax administration, greatly impedes the flow of 
information needed for efficient administration. 
 
Second, VAT revenue is divided between central and state governments in a rather unusual 
way. State governments are allocated all the revenue they collect from unincorporated 
businesses, while central government keeps most of the revenue it collects from 
incorporated firms. Neighbouring businesses that differ in legal form only may be subject to 
different tax administrations, and pay taxes to different levels of government. As a result, the 
division of VAT revenue is subject to the legal form chosen by entrepreneurs for their 
businesses.  
 
Third, and most importantly, all VAT revenue collected by state governments, and a portion 
of VAT revenue collected by the central government, are allocated to states on the basis of 
the seller’s place of registration, rather than the location of the customer. VAT is designed to 
be a consumption tax, paid where consumers are located, and the allocation of revenue to 
the sellers’ states is contrary to the fundamental principle of VAT as a tax on consumption. 
More significantly, the system leads to perverse cross-subsidies in the case of business-to-
business sales – where VAT on sales is kept by the seller’s state, while the buyer’s state 
loses revenue when the receiving business claims a credit for VAT paid to the seller’s state. 
As most business-to-business sales flow from wealthier states to poorer states, the result is 
cross-subsidies from the poorer states to their wealthier counterparts. 
 
This report recognises the fact that unwinding the current separation of tax administration 
powers would be difficult to achieve in the current political climate. It suggests a process of 
gradual reform, commencing with better coordination, standardisation and communication 
between state and central administrations. It similarly recognises that for similar reasons the 
current entitlement of states to 100 per cent of VAT revenue remitted by unincorporated 
businesses, and 30 per cent of VAT revenue remitted by companies, would be difficult to 
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change. It suggests, however, that a clearing house system could be established to 
redistribute entitlements between states so the share of VAT revenue to which states are 
entitled is ultimately based on a ‘fiscal equalisation’ calculation, with the aim of enabling all 
states to provide equal value programmes and benefits to their citizens. Transitional rules 
that gradually increase the proportion of VAT revenue subject to a fiscal equalisation formula 
can smooth the impact of shifts of revenue that result from the change. 
 
Keywords: revenue assignment; fiscal federalism; subnational VAT; fiscal autonomy; social 
equalisation.   
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Introduction 
 
Value added tax (VAT) is now levied by the vast majority of countries. Fiscal federalism 
issues in respect of VAT do not arise in unitary states, but questions arise as to the optimal 
division of VAT imposition rights and VAT revenue in federal states. Traditionally, the general 
public finance consensus is that it is highly undesirable to have separate VATs enacted by 
subnational governments, or for central and subordinate governments to share responsibility 
for collecting VAT. A single national VAT levied by the central government, which may, in 
turn, retain the income or use a formula to distribute some (e.g. Germany) or even all (e.g. 
Australia) of the revenue among the states, has generally been recommended as the 
preferred model for VAT in federal jurisdictions (Tait 1988), and, in particular, in the context 
of developing and transitional countries (Bird and Gendron 2005). A somewhat more 
nuanced view in the case of advanced economies has emerged following the adoption of a 
VAT in Canada with what are, in effect, provincial surcharges built on to the national VAT. 
However, the underlying consensus remains intact, particularly in the case of developing and 
transitional jurisdictions. 
 
While a single VAT, levied by a federal government and distributed by means of a formula 
where some VAT funds are passed on to regional governments, is common, there are many 
deviations from this model in practice. China levies a single national VAT, but distributes half 
of the tax to provinces on the basis of the locations from which supplies are made.1 The 
member states of the European Union (EU) levy separate VATs, subject to conformity with 
an EU law (the VAT Directive), while revenue is redistributed through a combination of VAT 
rules and a central clearing house on the basis of the place of consumption. Most Canadian 
provinces impose a surcharge on the federal VAT that is collected by the federal government 
on behalf of the provinces, except in the province of Quebec – where the provincial 
government collects the Quebec Sales Tax (QST) and federal Goods and Services Tax 
(GST) (as VAT is called in Canada), and passes the federal portion on to the central 
government. The revenue attributable to provincial surcharges is distributed to the provincial 
governments on the basis of place of consumption, and the federal government portion flows 
to the federal government’s consolidated revenue.2  
 
While not common, subnational VATs or VAT administration roles are found in a number of 
federal jurisdictions. The bifurcated Ethiopian VAT may be unique, however, with VAT 
administration and revenue from some classes of taxpayers assigned to the federal 
government, and from others to regional governments. VAT from unincorporated businesses, 
referred to as sole traders in Ethiopia, is assigned to regional governments, while VAT from 
private companies is jointly shared between the federal and regional governments.3  
 
Although there is recognition in several quarters that the current system is problematic in 
many respects, to date there has been little study of the subnational VAT in Ethiopia. 
Unanswered questions range from the constitutional validity of the arrangements, through to 
the administration and compliance costs of the system. Nor has there been serious 
consideration of reform options that can address these issues within the current legal, 
political and economic frameworks. This study investigates these issues, assessing the legal 
framework and practice of assigning VAT revenue in Ethiopia, and its implications for states’ 
                                                 
1  Provincial governments will share the 50% among themselves according to taxation location (Xinhua Finance Agency 
2016). 
2  The provincial share of GST revenue (Harmonized Sales Tax (HST)) is allocated on the basis of place of consumption 
or destination. This is determined by a formula that allocates the national GST taxable base among all provinces - not 
just the HST provinces - and then applies the tax rate applicable to that province to its calculated share of the base (Bird 
2013).  
3  Private companies in this paper refers to all incorporated businesses, excluding state-owned enterprises. 
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fiscal capacity. In this context, it reviews the operation of the current arrangements for 
administration of VAT by the federal and regional governments, the current arrangement of 
VAT revenue assignment, and the constraints that may impact on alternative VAT 
administrative and revenue assignment schemes.  
 
The study is based on data obtained through in-depth interviews held with twenty-three key 
informants from the House of Federation, Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation 
(MoFEC), Ethiopian Revenue and Customs, Tigray regional revenue, Amhara regional 
revenue, Oromia regional revenue and Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples (SNNP) 
regional revenue authorities, and an academic working on fiscal federalism.4 The study 
reviewed relevant documents, including the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) 
Constitution, minutes of various meetings of the House of Federation and the House of 
People’s Representatives, relevant proclamations, letters written by the then Minister of 
Revenues and the head of the Federal Inland Revenue Authority (FIRA) and other 
documents. Revenue, expenditure and federal grant data, among others, were sourced from 
MoFEC. 
 
The study is organised into eight sections. Section 1 provides a brief survey of the fiscal 
structure in Ethiopia, and is followed by a review of fiscal federalism principles and scholarly 
views on VAT revenue assignment. Section 3 sets out the operation of subnational VAT, and 
is followed by a description of the allocation of VAT revenue in Ethiopia in Section 4. 
Sections 5 and 6 explore the consequences of the current VAT source and allocation rules 
and reform alternatives respectively. Finally, a path forward and conclusions are considered 
in Sections 7 and 8.  
 
 
1  A brief review of the fiscal structure in 
Ethiopia  
 
The federal government collects the lion’s share of tax revenue in Ethiopia, with the nine 
regional states and two chartered cities accounting for only 25 per cent of total tax revenue in 
FY 2015/16. Of that amount, the largest share was collected by Addis Ababa (11.5%), 
followed by Oromia (4.57%), Amhara (2.71%) and SNNP (2.37%), with the remaining six 
regional states and Dire Dawa city administration accounting for less than 4 per cent of total 
tax revenue. 
 
Tax revenue received by regional states is insufficient to meet expenditure needs, and all 
subordinate governments, with the exception of Addis Ababa city administration, rely on 
central government transfers to cover most of their spending. In FY 2015/16, for example, 
federal subsidies to regions (excluding Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) grants) 
accounted for 42 per cent of federal total revenue and 51 per cent of federal tax revenue. In 
that year, Tigray regional state financed 43 per cent of its expenditure from its own revenue, 
and Amhara, Oromia and SNNP regional states covered about 30 per cent of their 
expenditure from local revenue, with most other regional states relying to a greater extent on 
central government transfers (Table 1).  
 
                                                 
4  The in-depth interviews cover the federal government, and the four largest regional governments, in Amhara, Oromia, 
SNNP and Tigray regional states.   
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Table 1 Revenue and expenditure (FY 2015/16) (million Birr)* 
Regional states Revenue (tax and 
non-tax5) 
Total tax 
revenue 
Expenditure 
(recurrent 
and capital)  
Block grants Total grants 
(block and 
SDG grants)  
Regional states’ 
local revenue as 
share of 
expenditure 
Tigray 4,094.33 (1.77%) 3,210.17 
(1.68%) 
9,581.94 5,203.7 6,061.74 0.43 
Afar 562.24 (0.24%) 518.59 
(0.27%) 
3,136.44 2,272.1 2,646.53 0.18 
Amhara 6,836.35 (2.95%) 5,158.32 
(2.71%) 
23,866.37 16,931.2 19,720.02 0.29 
Oromia 10,142.77 (4.38%) 8,703.24 
(4.57%) 
34,616.81 23,660.3 27,554.34 0.29 
Somali 1,901.82 (0.82%) 1,540.31 
(0.81%) 
7,274.45 5,919.6 6,893.96 0.26 
Benishangul-Gumuz 513.6 (0.22%) 430.17 
(0.23%) 
2,213.96 1,540.9 1,798.93 0.23 
SNNP 6,335.58 (2.73%) 4,517.33 
(2.37%) 
20,909.45 14,656.2 17,069.41 0.3 
Gambella 349.21 (0.15%) 285.08 
(0.15%) 
1785.87 1,088.8 1268.75 0.2 
Harari 348.84 (0.15%) 303.5 
(0.16%) 
991.61 729.6 849.63 0.35 
Addis Ababa 24,306.45 
(10.49%) 
21,918.71 
(11.50%) 
20,962.77 0 0 1.16 
Dire Dawa 838.15 (0.36%) 677.08 
(0.36%) 
1,660.79 847.6 986.78 0.5 
Total (regions) 56,229.34 
(24.75%) 
47,262.51 
(25.33%) 
127,000.5 72,850.1 84,850.08 0.44 
Federal government  174,427.90 
(75.25%) 
142,454.70 
(74.77%) 
Not available 42%**(51%)*** 49% (^59%)^  ^ N/A 
General government  231,805.20 
(100%) 
190,519.70 
(100%) 
280,892.81 N/A N/A N/A 
* figures in parenthesis represent percentage share from the total  
** block grants to regions (excluding SDG) as a share of total federal revenue  
*** block grants to regions (excluding SDG) as a share of total federal revenue  
 ^ total grants to regions as a share of total federal revenue  
^^  total grants to regions as a share of total federal tax revenue  
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation and own computations 
 
 
2  Fiscal federalism 
 
Fiscal federalism comprises both the distribution of functions and tax revenue sources 
between central and regional governments (Oates 1999), and the distribution of decision-
making power to two levels of government (Girma 2003).  
 
It has been suggested that fiscal decentralisation – the transfer of fiscal resources and 
spending responsibilities from central authorities to regional governments – can improve the 
efficiency, autonomy and accountability of public sector institutions, and even facilitate rapid 
economic growth (Rodden 2006). Bird et al. (2003) further argue that decentralisation can 
more effectively promote democratic and participatory forms of government, improving the 
responsiveness and accountability of politicians and bureaucrats, and achieving closer 
correspondence between the basket of publicly provided goods and services, and the 
preferences of beneficiaries (taxpayers) in the various subnational jurisdictions.  
 
Fiscal decentralisation encompasses three principal elements: the assignment of 
responsibilities and functions to different levels of government, the assignment of taxation 
powers to fund expenditure required to carry out those responsibilities and functions, and the 
                                                 
5  Non-tax revenue includes charges and fees, sales of goods and services, government investment income, pension 
contributions, miscellaneous income and municipality revenue.  
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design of intergovernmental transfers of fiscal resources where taxing powers are insufficient 
to cover the costs of assigned responsibilities (Girma 2003). Bird (1999) discusses different 
approaches in the assignment of fiscal responsibilities and functions. Clearly, national public 
goods, such as national defence and foreign affairs, must be provided by the central 
government (Oates 1999). Also falling within the central government’s remit is responsibility 
for macroeconomic stability and broad income redistribution (Oates 1999). Regional 
governments may be best placed to offer direct services, including local healthcare, welfare 
and education. 
 
In theory, a division of government responsibilities need not be accompanied by a division of 
taxing powers – a central government could assign responsibilities to regional governments 
and make transfer payments to those lower-tier governments. A stark vertical fiscal 
imbalance of this sort is unlikely to achieve the objectives of decentralisation, however, and 
the preferable approach is to assign separate taxing rights to regional governments to 
achieve the goals of enhancing fiscal autonomy, responsibility and accountability (Bird 1999, 
2001; McLure 2001).  
 
Conventional fiscal federalism theory suggests taxes on mobile tax bases, redistributive 
taxes, taxes that could easily be exported to other jurisdictions, taxes on unevenly distributed 
tax bases, taxes that have large cyclical fluctuations and taxes that involve considerable 
economies of scale in tax administration should be assigned to the federal government 
(Tanzi and Zee 2000; Bird 1999). This leaves immovable bases or local activities as suitable 
tax bases for regional governments. In practice, however, the assignment of tax bases has 
as much to do with politics as with economic principles.  
 
 
3  Subnational VAT in practice 
 
The model VAT operates as a tax on final consumption, a goal that is achieved through two 
design features. The first is an input tax credit system that allows businesses to recover VAT 
paid on inputs so the burden of tax falls only on final consumers, and the second is a rule 
that zero-rates exports and taxes imports, removing all taxes in the place of supply and 
allowing full taxation in the place of consumption. These features are found in almost all 
national VATs, and assume the existence of border controls around the jurisdiction. It is, 
accordingly, very difficult to implement these principles using regional VATs within a single 
market where there are no border controls between parts of the same market (Dahlby 2001), 
and historically subnational VATs were considered to be infeasible (Bird 1999).  
 
Efforts seeking to allocate VAT revenue to regional governments have developed a wide 
range of models to achieve this aim that roughly fall into six variations, in addition to the 
Ethiopian system described further in the following section.  
 
3.1 Single national tax 
 
The simplest model used to allocate VAT revenue to regional governments is that used in 
Germany, Austria, Belgium, Spain, Russia and Australia: a single national VAT with revenue 
distributed to regional governments on the basis of a formula. In the German case, about half 
of VAT revenue is hypothecated for distribution to the regional governments (Bird 2013), with 
distribution based primarily on population subject to an equalisation factor for revenue 
capacity. In Australia, 100 per cent of revenue from the national VAT is distributed to the 
states for equalisation purposes. 
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3.2 Separate regional government VATs and a multiple element allocation 
regime 
 
At the other end of the spectrum of systems to allocate VAT revenue is the EU model of 
exclusive subnational VATs collected by local jurisdictions, with a proportion of the net 
collection paid to the central authority (the EU). The system was relatively easy to operate 
when member states of the single economic union retained borders for tax purposes – cross-
border sales within the union could be subject to border adjustments – but new systems were 
needed once all tax borders disappeared within the single economic union. Following several 
decades of experimentation, a multiple-element regime is in place with different rules for 
cross-border supplies to registered and unregistered customers, and, in the latter group, 
different rules for supplies of goods and selected services.  
 
In the case of cross-border intra-EU supplies to registered customers, supplies are zero-
rated to the supplier and taxed in the hands of the customer by means of a ‘reverse charge’ 
rule. Cross-border intra-EU supplies of goods and many services to unregistered customers 
are subject to VAT in the jurisdiction in which the supplier is located. Supplies of a limited 
class of services delivered by the web or electronic transmission are subject to tax in the 
supplier’s jurisdiction, but at the rate of the customer’s jurisdiction. The tax is distributed to 
the customer’s jurisdiction through a central clearing house.  
 
The unique system used in the EU reflects the range of compromises needed to integrate 
separate member states’ VAT systems into a common market. With the exception of the 
small number of original members belonging to the European Economic Community, the 
EU’s predecessor, all member states had national VAT systems in place prior to joining the 
EU, and those remained in place following accession to the EU. The resulting system 
seriously compromises many fundamental principles of VAT, imposing significant compliance 
costs on business, high costs of administration, and, most importantly, departing from one of 
the basic design principles of VAT – the notion that the supplier should be indifferent to the 
tax status of the customer. Instead, in the current EU system businesses must determine the 
tax status of all out-of-state customers prior to making a supply. In recent years, a number of 
jurisdictions outside the EU have adopted similar place-of-taxation rules for non-resident 
enterprises making electronic supplies to final consumers in those jurisdictions, creating 
similar compliance issues.  
 
3.3 Canadian four-variation systems 
 
A third model found in Canada combines four separate systems in a single political economic 
community. As with the EU outcome, the unique Canadian structure reflects the distinct 
history and political relationships in that jurisdiction, particularly the special relationship 
between the only majority French-speaking province, Quebec, and the national government. 
In one province, the federal GST is the only sales tax levied. In three provinces, the federal 
government imposes federal GST on supplies, and provincial governments impose and 
administer separate retail sales taxes (RSTs). In five provinces, provincial VATs are imposed 
as surcharges on federal GST, yielding what is known as Harmonized Sales Tax (HST). The 
HST is administered exclusively by the federal government, and the provincial share of the 
combined taxes are distributed on the basis of place of consumption, calculated by reference 
to national accounts data rather than tracking of actual individual supplies. Finally, one 
province, Quebec, imposes its own provincial VAT, the Quebec sales tax (QST), in addition 
to the federal GST (Bird 2013).6 The QST is similar, but not identical, to federal GST.7 An 
agreement reflecting Quebec’s unique political status in the Canadian federation has resulted 
                                                 
6  QST and GST rates are 9.975% and 5% respectively.  
7  e.g. as Bird (2013) notes, the QST restricts input credits related to goods such as fuel.  
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in the Quebec tax administration collecting provincial QST and federal GST, as well as out-
of-province HST where Quebec firms operate in HST jurisdictions.  
 
For over twenty years, Quebec has been the only subnational jurisdiction in the world to 
operate an independently administered destination-based VAT (Bird 2013). While the QST-
federal GST arrangements in Canada have proven to be administratively feasible and 
capable of dealing with cross-border trade between registered firms, businesses subject to 
the two taxes may face higher compliance costs than their counterparts in provinces using 
the single HST (Bird 2014), although others suggest the additional costs may be minimal 
(Plamondon and Zussman 1998). The unique system reflects Quebec’s goal of political and 
fiscal autonomy within a national federation, and federal accommodation of that goal in the 
interest of political harmony. 
 
3.4 Parallel national and subnational VATs 
 
Until 2017, the national and state governments in India imposed an array of indirect taxes, 
including a tax on the manufacture and production of goods, a tax on specified services and 
a tax on interstate sales of goods, while states levied separate taxes on goods (OECD 2012; 
Mukherjee 2017; Sen 2015). While it was long recognised that the inefficient tax system, and 
in particular cascading taxes, acted as a restraint on economic growth, political and 
constitutional constraints precluded reform of the complex overlapping and cascading tax 
regime. With constitutional reform and political agreement in 2017, the array of central and 
state taxes were abolished in favour of a dual GST regime based on a national GST and 
separate state GSTs. The state GSTs, administered locally, apply to supplies made within a 
single state. Interstate supplies and imports are subject to a separate integrated GST 
collected by the central government (GST Council 2017). The state portion of the integrated 
GST tax passes to the state of the buyer with appropriate transfers of input tax credits.  
 
3.5 Revenue allocation on the basis of place of sale 
 
Until 2016, indirect taxation in China was divided between a VAT imposed by the central 
government on the supply of goods, and a separate ‘Business Tax’ imposed by provincial 
governments on the supply of services (albeit on the basis of a central government 
regulation). Since 2016, VAT on goods and services has been levied as a national tax, with a 
share allocated to the subordinate jurisdictions on the basis of place of sale.8 This system 
causes significant economic distortions on a number of fronts. In effect, the supplying 
jurisdiction collects all the tax, even if consumption takes place in another jurisdiction. The 
problem is exacerbated in the case of business-to-business sales, if sales take place in one 
jurisdiction and input tax credits are claimed by customers in other jurisdictions. Local 
governments, seeking a share of tax revenue from the local operations of a company, may 
regard each branch as a separate taxpayer, leading to many complications for national 
enterprises with branches across the country. 
 
3.6 Regional taxes on supplies of goods and rendering of certain services 
 
A sixth model can be found in Brazil, one of the first nations to levy a VAT. The national 
government levies a VAT (the Impusto sobre Productors Industrialisados (IPI)),9 mainly on the 
manufacturing sector, with rates varying by commodity and an average rate of around 20 per 
cent. Separately, the states levy VAT on the supply of goods and rendering of certain types of 
                                                 
8  For a transitional period of two to three years, VAT revenue will be equally (50:50) shared between the central and 
provincial governments. The current rule allocating the provincial share on the basis of location of the supplier remains 
in place (Shen and Krever 2017). 
9  Tax imposed on the sale of imported and domestic manufactured goods. This tax uses multiple rates which can be ad 
valorem or specific, thus varying depending on the type of the product and how essential it is (de Carvalho 2016). 
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services (Imposto sobre Circulação de Mercadorias e Serviços (ICMS)) (de Carvalho 2016).10 
The twenty-seven regional (twenty-six states and the federal district) ICMS are origin-based, 
with standard rates ranging from 17 per cent to 19 per cent on supplies within the state, and a 
federally-established rate of 12 per cent on interstate transactions (7% on goods sent to less 
developed regions) (Bird 2013). As a consequence of the 1988 Federal Constitution, ICMS is 
not imposed on exports (de Carvalho 2016). Each state has its own ICMS law, with different 
rates, exemptions and incentives.11 While Brazil’s regional VATs have, for over forty years, 
succeeded in providing very substantial own revenue to state governments (Bird 2013), 
because they only apply to a very limited number of services they are highly problematic from 
a tax policy perspective. Apart from omitting the growing economic sector from the tax base, 
a supposed border between goods and services becomes increasingly artificial as supplies 
are bundled in a modern economy. At the same time, the distinction between intra-state and 
interstate supplies adds many levels of complexity and distortions to the tax, seen in some 
quarters as the ‘horrible example’ that proves the point that VAT should be levied by national 
governments only (Bird 1999).  
 
A large dispersion of effective rates across goods and services, across the national territory, 
and the predominantly origin-based system, facilitate the use of the ICMS as an instrument of 
industrial policy, and has led to predatory competition (fiscal war) among states through the 
granting of incentives to attract enterprises (Ter-Minassian 2012).  
 
 
4  Allocation of VAT revenue in Ethiopia 
 
The design of the Ethiopian VAT looks similar to other modern VATs. In practice, however, it 
follows a distinctive path shaped by constitutional boundaries and interpretations, and a 
chain of government decisions. 
 
4.1 Constitutional and administrative background 
 
Ethiopia is a federal state comprising nine regions, referred to as states in the 1995 
Constitution, and two chartered cities treated as federal territory – Addis Ababa and Dire 
Dawa. The FDRE Constitution identifies three groups of revenue sources that are assigned 
either exclusively to the federal government (Art. 96) or states (Art. 97), or jointly to both 
levels of government (Art. 98): 
 
Taxes assigned exclusively to the federal government include: 
 
 Income tax on employees of the federal government and international organisations; 
 Income, profit, sales and excise taxes on enterprises owned by the federal 
government; 
 Tax on the income and winnings of national lotteries and other games of chance;  
 Taxes on the income of air, rail and sea transport services; and  
 Taxes on the income of houses and properties owned by the federal government. 
 
                                                 
10  In addition to IPI and ICMS, the following consumption taxes are imposed: Social Integration Program (PIS) - a federal 
cumulative tax on goods and services; Contribution for the Financing of Social Security (COFINS) - a federal cumulative 
tax on goods and services; Contribution of Intervention in the Economic Domain (CIDE) – a federal single-stage tax on 
gasoline and diesel; and Tax on Services (ISS) - a municipal cumulative tax on services. 
11  While states set their own tax rates on intra-state transactions, the ICMS imposed on interstate trade is constrained by 
national rules for the ICMS, and is further regulated through several complementary laws. Each state establishes its 
own ICMS rate for intra-state transactions autonomously (de Carvalho 2016). Arretche (2007), cited in Bird (2013), also 
notes that the federal government not only establishes what states and municipalities can tax , but may also specify the 
conditions under which they can exercise their fiscal authority . 
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Taxes assigned exclusively to states include: 
 
 Income taxes on employees of the state and private enterprises; 
 Taxes on the income of private farmers and farmers incorporated in cooperative 
associations; 
 Profit and sales taxes on sole traders carrying out business within their territory; and 
 Profit, sales, excise and personal income taxes on the income of enterprises owned 
by the states. 
 
Taxes assigned concurrently to both the federal government and states: 
 
 Profit, sales, excise and personal income taxes on enterprises they jointly own;  
 Taxes on the profits and sales of companies and on dividends due to shareholders; 
and  
 Taxes on incomes derived from large-scale mining and all petroleum and gas 
operations, and royalties on such operations. 
 
As the Constitution pre-dates VAT, the document contains no assignment of the power to 
levy VAT. Anticipating the possibility of new taxes not included in the document, the 
Constitution separately grants the House of Federation and the House of Peoples’ 
Representatives the power to assign taxing rights over bases that are not specified in the 
Constitution when sitting in a joint session.12 The two Houses met jointly in 2002, prior to the 
commencement of VAT, to assign the power to legislate VAT.13 The joint decision was to 
assign all rights to legislate VAT to the federal government, while leaving the administration 
responsibility undecided.14 The Proclamation establishing VAT was enacted in 2002,15 and 
the tax commenced in 2003. Importantly, the Proclamation was silent on the question of how 
revenue would be allocated. 
 
An issue crucial to subsequent decisions regarding administration of VAT and allocation of 
VAT revenue was the relationship between VAT and the sales tax it replaced. While the right 
of the federal government to legislate VAT derived from a decision by a joint session of the 
House of Federation and the House of Peoples’ Representatives, the power to levy sales tax 
had been constitutionally divided between the different levels of government. Article 97(4) of 
the Constitution granted state governments exclusive power to impose sales tax on sole 
traders, and Article 98(2) gave the state and federal governments concurrent power to 
impose sales tax on private companies.16 Recognising the practical difficulties of jointly 
imposing and collecting taxes assigned to both levels of the government, the House of 
Peoples’ Representatives and the House of Federation amended Article 98 of the 
Constitution dealing with concurrent power of taxation. The amendment exclusively assigned 
the power of imposing and collecting revenue to the federal government; this had been 
assigned to both the federal government and regional states. The exclusive assignment of 
taxing rights and collection responsibilities to the federal government did not, however, 
                                                 
12  Constitution, Art. 99. 
13  Minutes, House of Federation and House of Peoples’ Representatives joint session held on Miazia 3, 1994 EC (2002).  
14  Minutes, House of Federation and House of Peoples’ Representatives joint session held on Miazia 3, 1994 EC (2002). 
On the other hand, a decision report by House of Peoples’ Representatives’ Budget and Finance Affairs and Legal and 
Administration Affairs Standing Committees on the draft VAT law, Sene 27, 1994EC (2002) shows that the decision by 
the joint session of two houses was on the assignment of the rights of levying and collecting a VAT to the federal 
government.  
15  VAT Proclamation No. 285/2002.  
16  The assignment of sales taxes imposition and collection rights over private companies is not apparent in English 
translations of the Ethiopian Constitution. The Amharic version of Article 98(2) of the constitution assigns sales taxes 
from companies to both tiers of the government. As taxing rights over state-owned, federal government-owned, and 
jointly state- and federally-owned enterprises are assigned to those governments in Articles 96(3), 97(7) and 98(1) 
respectively, the reference to ‘companies’ in the Amharic version of Article 98(2) can only be read as a reference to 
private companies.  
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impact the division of revenue between the two levels of government that held concurrent 
taxing rights. Separately, Article 62(7) of the Constitution left the allocation of revenue from 
concurrent taxes to be decided by the House of Federation.17 The House of Federation 
divided tax revenue from all concurrent taxes,18 allocating 70 per cent of the sales tax 
payable by private companies to the federal government, and 30 per cent to state 
governments. 
 
On the face of it, the replacement of sales tax with VAT altered the fiscal landscape in 
Ethiopia significantly. As a result of the Constitution and an explicit legislative decision, the 
states had formerly enjoyed the right to all revenue from sales tax paid by sole traders and 
30 per cent of the sales tax paid by private companies, as well as 100 per cent of the sales 
tax paid by state government-owned companies. The power to enact and collect VAT had 
been assigned exclusively to the federal government,19 but there was no legislative guidance 
on how VAT should be distributed, and the decision of the joint session of the two Houses 
that handed enactment rights to the federal government did not consider the issue of who 
should administer VAT.20 However, prior to this joint decision, each House separately 
debated the proposed assignment; minutes of the debate in the House of Federation reveal 
the expectation of representatives that VAT revenue would be divided in the same manner 
as its predecessor, the sales tax, notwithstanding the exclusive assignment of the right of 
enacting the tax to the federal government.  
 
In the absence of clear legislative direction on the administration and assignment of VAT 
revenue, implementation of VAT commenced in 2003 with the Ethiopian Customs Authority 
collecting the tax on imports, and the Federal Inland Revenue Authority (FIRA) responsible 
for collecting the tax on domestic transactions. Initially, FIRA unilaterally divided all VAT 
revenue between the federal government and states, with 70 per cent transferred to the 
federal government and 30 per cent to the states.21 No allocation of VAT revenue from 
companies was made to the two chartered cities, Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa, which 
technically are federal government territories though they effectively function similarly to 
states. 
 
The assumption of responsibility by FIRA to administer VAT in respect of all types of 
taxpayers proved problematic. FIRA was not in a position to administer VAT effectively 
across the entire country, as it had no offices in smaller regional centres and limited capacity 
elsewhere to bring small taxpayers formerly administered by regional revenue authorities into 
the VAT net. The result was highly differential tax treatment between VAT-registered 
companies and largely unregistered sole traders. 
 
A year after the official commencement of VAT, the Ministry of Revenues, recognising FIRA’s 
limited capacity and using its tax administration powers,22 delegated the responsibility for 
applying VAT to sole traders to the states and chartered cities on behalf of FIRA. At the 
                                                 
17  Minutes, House of Federation and House of Peoples’ Representatives joint session held on Miazia 2, 1989 EC (1997) 
confirm the decision in the meeting to number the proclamation as 71/1989 EC (1997). However, in interviews 
conducted by the researchers, some representatives noted that the amendment to the constitution was not officially 
proclaimed as a law in Negarit Gazette, the official Gazette.  
18  FIRA, letter to branch offices to communicate House of Federation’s decision on concurrent taxes allocation formula 
dated Nehassie 21, 1995 EC (2003). 
19  Interviews with officials from government agencies covered by the study.  
20  Minutes, House of Federation and House of Peoples’ Representatives joint session held on Miazia 3, 1994 EC (2002) 
are silent on the assignment of VAT collection responsibilities to the federal government. 
21  Ministry of Revenues, letter to delegate regional states and city administrations for the administration of VAT payable by 
sole traders, Nehassie 05, 1996 EC (2004), implies that FIRA had initially divided all VAT revenue (paid by sole traders 
and private companies) using the formula adopted by the House of Federation for sales tax revenue from companies. 
On the other hand, interviews with officials were mixed. Some respondents indicated that , before the delegation in 2004, 
FIRA used to transfer 100% and 30% of VAT payable by sole traders and private companies respectively to regional 
states, while other respondents confirm what is implied in the letter to delegate regional states. 
22  FIRA re-establishment proclamation No 367/1995 EC (2003) provided legislative authority for these actions. 
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same time, the Ministry of Revenues indicated the state administrations could allocate 100 
per cent of VAT revenue from sole traders to the regional governments, restoring the former 
sales tax allocation approach.23 FIRA retained responsibility for applying VAT to private 
companies, and continued to apply the 70 per cent-30 per cent division of VAT revenue from 
companies that it had adopted initially. The division of responsibilities and revenue 
entitlement agreements continued, in effect, after 2008 when the Ethiopian Customs 
Authority, responsible for collection of VAT on imports, and FIRA were amalgamated into the 
Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority (ERCA) in 2008. 
 
4.2 The source of VAT revenue 
 
Articles 51(10) and 52(2e) of the FDRE Constitution empower the federal government and 
regional states respectively to levy and collect taxes and duties on revenue sources reserved 
to each of them. FIRA interpreted the source of sales tax revenue to be the state in which the 
supplier was located.  
 
Unlike a sales tax based on specific transactions, income tax is based on a calculation of 
annual income and expenses, making it difficult to attribute to particular events or locations. 
Recognising this constraint, the Council of Ministers issued a surrogate source of income 
rule for the income tax. Specifically, the assignment of income tax revenue follows the place 
of declaration, which, in turn, refers to the place at which a sole trader is registered or a 
private company is incorporated.24 Following the commencement of VAT in 2003, FIRA 
transmogrified the source of income rule and treated the source of VAT to be the place of 
registration or incorporation. As the place of registration or incorporation coincided with the 
place of Tax Identification Number (TIN) issuance for businesses, FIRA simply applied the 
place of TIN issuance universally as the source of VAT revenue.25 Following the delegation 
of VAT administration to state revenue bureaus in 2004, FIRA, and later ERCA, continued to 
attribute VAT revenue to the place of TIN issuance of the supplier and state revenue bureaus 
used the same test when assessing sole traders.  
 
 
5  Consequences of the current VAT source 
and allocation rules 
 
The decision to allocate all VAT revenue from sole traders and a portion of VAT revenue 
from private companies to the states, together with the administrative decision to attribute the 
source of VAT revenue to the place of TIN issuance, has led to a number of undesirable 
outcomes. These include concern over the lack of an adequate legal framework, and 
inappropriate revenue transfers, in particular a shift of VAT revenue from less wealthy to 
wealthier states, and, in some cases, from one zone to another within a regional state. The 
latter primarily applies in SNNP regional state.  
 
                                                 
23  Ministry of Revenues, letter to delegate regional states and city administrations for the administration of VAT payable by 
sole traders, dated Nehassie 05, 1996 EC (2004).  
24  Article 23, Council of Ministers’ Income Tax Regulations No 78/2002, provided that declaration of income would be 
made to the federal or regional tax authority, as appropriate. Specifically, it had been provided that if a resident taxpayer 
was engaged in more than one business activity, the declaration should be to the tax authority where the head office of 
the business is situated. Similarly, non-residents were required to declare their income to the tax authority where most 
of the income was derived. However, effective from 8 July 2017, these regulations were repealed and replaced by new 
regulations which appear to be silent on these matters.  
25  Interviews with federal authorities.  
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5.1 Lack of an adequate legal framework  
 
The assignment of the exclusive power to enact a VAT law to the federal government, 
through a joint session of the House of Federation and the House of Peoples’ 
Representatives, directly followed the process clearly set out in the Constitution for the 
adoption of new taxes that are not enumerated in the allocation Articles of that document. 
The decision by FIRA, through a letter issued by the Minister of Revenues, to delegate 
responsibility for collection of VAT from sole traders to state revenue authorities lay within 
FIRA’s administrative powers to use agents where appropriate, powers that were inherited by 
ERCA. The only piece of the puzzle lacking a clear constitutional or legislative authority 
appears to be the decision of the Ministry of Revenues to allow state revenue authorities to 
retain 100 per cent of the VAT they collect from sole traders, and to apply the 70 per cent 
federal-30 per cent state sales tax division to VAT from companies. The outcome, in terms of 
VAT paid by sole traders and private companies, may very well reflect an assumption by the 
House of Federation’s representatives that VAT should be allocated in the same manner as 
its predecessor, the sales tax. However, the states remain vulnerable so long as decisions 
like this rest in the hands of the federal ministry. In the absence of adequate legislative 
authority the states have no revenue security, while the decision impacting on revenue 
allocation undermines the process of effective fiscal federalism.  
 
5.2 State cross-subsidy of import VAT 
 
If VAT on imports were treated similarly to other VAT remitted by businesses, states would 
receive 100 per cent of import VAT collected from sole traders and 30 per cent of import VAT 
paid by private companies registered in the jurisdiction. Although some officials report that 
VAT paid by businesses on imports is periodically transferred to the state in which the 
importers are registered, the general consensus is that this revenue is retained by the federal 
government. There is some confusion concerning the basis for this retention, with some 
officials asserting constitutional authority for the policy on the basis of the constitutional 
assignment of taxes and duties on trade to the federal government.26 This view may reveal a 
misunderstanding about the nature of trade taxes and VAT. A trade tax, such as customs 
duty, falls on imports. In contrast, a VAT is a tax on final consumption,27 and its imposition on 
imports by registered businesses and domestic sales to registered businesses is more akin 
to a withholding tax that is recovered fully by importers by way of deduction from tax 
collected on later sales.  
 
The historical precedent of sales tax divisions seems to have played an important role in 
guiding the current practice of allocating VAT revenue as it applies to domestic sales, but has 
not extended to VAT collected on imports. One consequence of the structure of VAT as a tax 
on final consumption is a cross-subsidy of final tax by states to the federal government if it is 
assumed that VAT should apply to final consumption. As noted, the mechanism used to 
enable traders to recover VAT paid on imports allows importers to deduct an amount equal to 
the import VAT that was paid to the federal government at the time of importation from tax 
collected on sales to final consumers. The full tax is paid by final consumers, but the smaller 
amount is remitted to state revenue authorities. The federal government has already 
received VAT on imports, so the effect of offsetting VAT deduction is a loss to the state 
government of 100 per cent of the amount deducted in the case of a sole trader. If the 
importer is a private company, the federal government would receive 70 per cent of the 
revenue had there been no prepayment of VAT by way of import VAT. This means the 
deduction for import VAT only costs the state 30 per cent of the amount deducted. In both 
                                                 
26  This group includes a respondent from ERCA responsible for the transfer of revenue from the federal government to 
regional states. 
27  Under destination principle, one of the core features of VAT, as a tax on consumption, is that revenue should accrue to 
the jurisdiction where the final consumption takes place (OECD 2011). (See further Appendix 1.) 
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cases, tax paid by local consumers in the states in which traders are located is shifted 
through the traders to the central government, an outcome inconsistent with the generally 
assumed assignment to states of 100 per cent of VAT paid to sole traders and 30 per cent of 
VAT paid to private companies.  
 
5.3 Fragmented market cross-subsidies  
 
VAT was designed to operate as a consumption tax within a single market. Registered 
businesses offset input tax deductions for tax paid on purchases anywhere in the country 
against output tax collected from customers anywhere in the country. Serious cross-subsidy 
consequences follow, however, if the single market is artificially segmented into regions for 
VAT purposes.  
 
Technically, the actual source of VAT revenue is the destination where the tax is actually 
borne by a person consuming goods or services.28 As noted, for simplicity and practical 
reasons, FIRA initially, and its successor ERCA, have used the place of issuance of TINs of 
a seller as a surrogate identifier of the ‘source’ of VAT paid by the business’ customers. This 
policy choice reflects the difficulty of determining the contribution of each branch operating in 
different regional states to the VAT payable by an entire business. 
 
The place of registration for TIN purposes and the place of supply and consumption may 
coincide for many small sole traders, but are equally likely not to coincide for large 
incorporated enterprises. Very large enterprises, in particular, often incorporate and register 
for TIN purposes in the large economic centres – chartered cities – prior to establishing 
actual operations elsewhere in the country, depending on the nature of the investment. 
Because VAT revenue is allocated on the basis of the place of TIN issuance, the states in 
which sales and consumption actually take place effectively subsidise the federal 
government, which collects the tax in the chartered city in which the seller is registered. 
 
Further cross-subsidies arise in the case of business-to-business interstate supplies. If the 
customer is a VAT-registered business, the tax remitted by the seller in its state will be 
claimed as deduction in the buyer’s state, reducing VAT revenue in the customer’s state by 
the amount retained by the seller’s state. The allocation of revenue in one place, and 
offsetting reduction in another, is equivalent to a cash subsidy from one government to 
another of between 30 per cent and 100 per cent of VAT collected, with the exact amount of 
the subsidy depending on the location of the supplier and customer and the legal status of 
the supplier and customer (company or sole trader). The twelve different effective subsidy 
regimes are illustrated in Appendix 2. 
 
In theory, if there were equal value sales between all types of traders and between all 
jurisdictions in Ethiopia, the cross-subsidies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction could cancel each 
other out. The economic reality on the ground makes this impossible, however. It is usually 
the case in federal jurisdictions that wealthier states house enterprises that make supplies to 
other regions, and poorer states are those acquiring high-value supplies from enterprises in 
wealthier states.29 Ethiopia is no exception to the general rule, and, as a result, in the case of 
business-to-business transactions, when VAT is levied on the basis of the supplier’s place of 
                                                 
28  Under the destination principle, exports are free of VAT and imports are taxed on the same basis and at the same rate 
as local production. Exports are made free by zero-rating them, so there is no VAT imposed on the export sale, but the 
exporter is able to recover all input tax incurred on acquisitions used to make the export sale. Destination-based VAT 
imposes the tax on commodities in the country of consumption. On the other hand, the origin principle would see tax 
imposed in the country of production - exports would be taxable in the country of the exporter, while imports enter the 
importer’s country free of VAT. (See further Appendix 1.) 
29  The exception to this general rule is where a resource-rich state, which is entitled to royalties for the sale of natural 
resource imports from wealthy industrial and commercial states in the same federation. The most important example of 
this is the Canadian province of Alberta, a jurisdiction lacking extensive industry but enjoying royalties for oil and gas 
extracted in the province. 
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registration, there is an explicit transfer subsidy from less wealthy states to wealthier states 
and the federal government.  
 
5.4 Intra-state subsidies 
 
In most Ethiopian regional states, VAT revenue accruing to the state government directly 
from sole traders, and via the federal government in the case of private companies, is 
applied around the state through the state’s expenditure programme. The practice is not 
universal, however. In the SNNP Region, the government seeks to accommodate the 
different interests and priorities of the vast array of ethno-linguistic groups in the state by 
allocating VAT revenue to lower-tier governments (zones/woreda) on the basis of the zone in 
which the seller’s TIN was issued.30 All the cross-subsidy problems inherent in interstate 
sales noted earlier are replicated within the SNNP Region where businesses in one part of 
the state make sales to customers in another part.  
 
The complications are compounded in the case of VAT payable by private companies. The 
federal government calculates the VAT to be transferred to a state government on a state-
wide basis, combining net receipts from all incorporated persons with TIN registrations in the 
state. The state receives 30 per cent of the VAT revenue collected from these businesses 
with no detailed information about the taxpayers from which the revenue was collected or 
their location within the regional state. The state is thus unable to distribute the revenue on 
time on its preferred basis of source, as identified by the place of registration of the 
supplier.31 
 
5.5 Administration aspects of fragmented VAT 
 
Following the delegation of all administrative responsibilities regarding the application of VAT 
to sole traders to state revenue authorities by FIRA through the Ministry of Revenues’ letter, 
and subsequently retained by its successor, ERCA, both the federal government and state 
revenue authorities administer VAT. The federal government’s footprint is small – in addition 
to a single Large Taxpayer Office for Addis Ababa and its surroundings, and two branch 
offices in the capital Addis Ababa,32 it has only seven branch offices for the rest of the 
country for domestic VAT and VAT on international trade.33 It has a further eight customs 
offices only administering taxes and duties on international trade, including VAT on imports,34 
and separately the Addis Ababa chartered city has delegated responsibility for administering 
the city’s taxes to ERCA.35 
 
The structure of the state revenue authorities that are responsible for administering VAT to 
the vast majority of registered enterprises follows the general governance structure adopted 
in each state. Below the capital city headquarters are subordinate offices in zones, cities, 
sub-cities and finally woreda levels. VAT is consequently being administered by the largest 
offices of the national revenue authority, down to the smallest local offices of state 
authorities. While there is no doubt that very local tax offices have advantages in terms of 
knowing local businesses and being in a position to offer frontline services, capacity clearly 
diminishes as the distance along the chain from central offices increases. At the bottom of 
the chain, woreda revenue authorities cannot access staff with the training and experience 
                                                 
30  Interviews with officials from a regional revenue authority.  
31  Interviews with officials from a regional revenue authority.  
32  These are the West Addis Ababa Branch and the East Addis Ababa Branch.  
33  These are located in Mekelle, Adama, Hawassa, Bahir Dar, Jimma, Dire Dawa and Kombolcha. These branch offices 
administer both domestic taxes, and taxes and duties on international trade.  
34  These are the Addis Ababa Kaliti, Addis Ababa Airport, Mojo, Gallafi, Jigjiga, Moyalle, Djibouti and Millie customs 
branch offices.  
35  To carry out this service, ERCA has 14 tax centres (10 small taxpayers’ branch offices and 4 medium taxpayers’ offices) 
and over 100 woreda micro taxpayers’ offices. 
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available in higher-level offices, have limited access to technology, particularly access to 
central records and communication, and have little or no lines of communication to revenue 
authorities in other states or to ERCA. 
 
Following a brief interlude, during which the ill-equipped FIRA attempted to apply the new tax 
nationwide, administration quickly reverted to the divided federal government and state 
government system that had been in place for the earlier sales tax. The outcome is very 
troublesome from a VAT administrative perspective. Unlike the sales tax, which was based 
solely on sales, VAT is collected as a net amount calculated as output tax on sales minus 
input tax incurred on acquisitions. Administration requires integrated systems that monitor 
both acquisitions and supplies, and track transactions through supply chains. That is, one 
enterprise’s net VAT is checked against the acquisitions of their business customers and the 
sales of their business suppliers. At the same time, input tax deductions claimed for imports 
are checked against customs records, and tax-free export sales are verified by reference to 
customs records. This process could only be followed in a fragmented administration system 
if all federal and state authorities, and all levels of administration within states, had 
immediate access to the full data of all other offices administering aspects of VAT. There is 
no indication that this will be achieved in the near future in Ethiopia. 
 
 
6  Reform alternatives 
 
In terms of its legal form, Ethiopian VAT resembles that of other jurisdictions, imposing a tax 
on final consumption by taxing all sales, but providing businesses with full deductions for 
VAT included in the cost of their acquisitions. However, the revenue is distributed between 
the federal government and states, and, in the case of interstate sales, between states, by 
reference to the legal form of the business and its place of TIN issuance. These rules have 
the effect of shifting the tax from a tax on consumption to a tax on suppliers, with states in 
which consumption takes place often subsidising the states in which suppliers are located or 
the federal government. At the same time, multiple agency administration of the single tax 
limits the prospect of full, fair and effective application of the tax. Reform of the tax system 
would address the allocation problem and provide an integrated administration regime. 
 
The starting point for consideration of reform options must be the fiscal purpose of VAT. In all 
scenarios it can be assumed that VAT will be used, as was its predecessor, the sales tax, in 
part to fund the responsibilities of the federal government, and in part to provide revenue to 
state governments. Sharing VAT revenue could be used to achieve one of two goals: 
national social equalisation objectives or fiscal autonomy aims. While successful models for 
both types of systems are available, none are compatible with the current division of VAT 
revenue and administrative responsibilities between the federal government and state 
governments on the basis of legal form of a business. 
 
6.1 A fiscal equalisation VAT  
 
Whether a federal jurisdiction adopts a fiscal equalisation regime to distribute some portion of 
tax revenue will depend on the country’s notions of national development and social justice. 
If many social services are provided by local governments and the country is committed to 
ensuring equal access to basic services for all citizens, the country is likely to adopt a fiscal 
equalisation formula to allocate a portion of national revenue to each state. Canada and 
Australia provide examples of countries with a strong commitment to fiscal equalisation 
principles and guaranteeing access to basic services for all citizens. Other jurisdictions, such 
as the United States, have no fiscal equalisation regime in place, and instead rely on specific 
federal government social programmes to make some services available to all citizens.  
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A fiscal equalisation objective for VAT is best achieved through a national tax with revenue 
(or a portion of revenue) distributed on the basis of a formula that takes into account the 
social needs and revenue-raising capacity of each state.  
 
To date, all countries using fiscal equalisation formulas for VAT have a single national tax 
authority responsible for administering the tax, to ensure fair and efficient administration 
across the nation. This does not mean, however, that a fiscal equalisation system could not 
operate in the context of the current administrative arrangements in Ethiopia. The principal 
problem with the current system, which allocates revenue on the basis of place of TIN 
issuance, is cross-subsidisation in the case of interstate transactions or imports, with VAT 
payable in the state of supply (or supplier’s TIN issuance), or federal government in the case 
of imports, and an offsetting tax reduction in the place of purchaser in the case of business-
to-business sales. This problem disappears if all revenue were pooled and distributed on the 
basis of a formula. Such a system would not require actual transfers of funds in many cases 
– provided the integrity of information sharing could be ensured, the equalisation distributions 
could be offset against the retention of funds collected by each jurisdiction, with minimal 
correction transfers required to ensure there is no cross-subsidisation from poor jurisdictions 
to wealthier jurisdictions. 
 
Two arguments have been made in opposition to a fiscal equalisation system for distributing 
VAT revenue. First, it is said that the adoption of a central fiscal equalisation system for VAT 
will undermine regional tax autonomy and regional tax administrative capacity. Both 
concerns can be addressed. While a shift to fiscal equalisation will affect the distribution of 
revenue from this particular tax, it will not impact on tax autonomy in all other respects, in 
particular with respect to regional states’ capacity to levy local taxes. A shift also need not 
impair administrative capacity if current collection and assessment arrangements remain in 
place, with the central government overseeing any transfers needed to redistribute revenue 
as required.  
 
The second concern with a fiscal equalisation formula is that it undermines local tax 
collection efforts if greater locally-sourced revenue will reduce entitlements under the fiscal 
equalisation regime. This concern can be addressed by a fiscal equalisation formula that 
does not reduce entitlements on a one-to-one basis with alternative revenue derived directly 
by state governments.  
 
A starting point for the development of a fiscal equalisation formula could be the House of 
Federation’s formula currently used for federal general purpose grants. This formula seeks to 
fund the gap between a measurement of selective tax sources that contribute more than 90 
per cent of the regional states’ total revenue and selective expenditure that accounts for 
more than 90 per cent of states’ outlays. While the formula has been criticised for its failings 
regarding the use of reliable and up-to-date data (Negussie 2015), it can be modified to 
address the noted shortcomings and potential impact on tax effort. 
 
6.2 Fiscal autonomy VATs  
 
Fiscal autonomy VATs fall into two broad categories. A system of full fiscal autonomy 
allocates VAT revenue to subordinate jurisdictions in which consumption actually takes 
place, and allows each subordinate jurisdiction to both administer its own VAT and set its 
own rates, encouraging local efficiencies and accommodating different social expectations. A 
system allowing for limited fiscal autonomy seeks only to allocate VAT revenue to 
subordinate jurisdictions in which consumption actually takes place, and allows local rate 
differentials. 
 
An example of the full fiscal autonomy model is Canada's federal GST and QST 
arrangement. Specifically, the provincial VAT used in Quebec, along with a single tax 
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administration to collect local government and central government VAT, provides a model for 
a subnational VAT that provides local fiscal autonomy, while avoiding economic distortions 
by base conformity on all important aspects with the federal VAT that might affect 
compliance costs (Bird 1999). It replicates the complexity of all destination-based systems 
that seek to allocate taxes to the place of consumption, requiring merchants to distinguish 
intra-provincial and inter-provincial sales. It also requires a sophisticated tax administration at 
the regional government level, and the full exchange of information between central and 
subnational tax administrations (Bird 2013). The special political relationship between 
Quebec and the federal government in Canada explains why only one province in the 
country uses this system. In the Ethiopian context, it would require a complete change in the 
division of tax administration responsibilties, changing from a system based on the legal form 
of businesses to a jurisdictional system, with each state responsible for all VAT in the state 
regardless of the form of the business.  
 
The limited fiscal autonomy model is also best illustrated with a Canadian example – the 
Canadian harmonized sales tax, based on a federal law, collected by the federal revenue 
authority but effectively set as a surcharge on the federal goods and services tax, with each 
participating province choosing its own rate of tax. Revenue is allocated to participating 
provinces on the basis of consumption, which is determined using national accounts rather 
than tracing individual supplies.  
 
Many of the elements of this system could be adopted in Ethiopia, even in the context of its 
current administration system. It would be simple to supplement the federal tax with state 
surcharges that possibly vary from state to state, and have the federal government and 
states continue parallel administration responsibilities for the combined taxes, with revenue 
notionally pooled to be distributed on the basis of consumption. The systems would involve 
an additional cost to businesses, however, as vendors would have to ascertain and collect 
VAT based on the rate imposed in the customers’ home states, rather than the rate in the 
vendor’s state, if the state surcharge rates differed from state to state. The key drawback to 
this option is the difficulty of allocating revenue on the basis of consumption. The Canadian 
formula for determining where consumption has taken place is complex, and relies on very 
precise and detailed data from national accounts – information that is not available to the 
same extent in Ethiopia, where even subnational GDP measurements are incomplete. It 
would be even more difficult to allocate VAT revenue within a state such as SNNP Region on 
the basis of consumption.  
 
In the absence of comprehensive data to measure accurately consumption by way of 
national data, the place of consumption could be determined by tracking individual supplies 
and the establishment of a clearing house to allocate input tax credits and output tax on 
sales for final consumption. The most successful of these is the clearing house system used 
in the EU. The European example shows that a clearing system that allows different tax rates 
in each subordinate jurisdiction is a viable alternative. At the same time, however, it 
demonstrates the levels of complexity imposed on businesses making interstate sales, and 
shows that the coordinated sharing of information is needed for the clearing house to work 
effectively. Current capacity in revenue offices is not sufficient to support the tracing and 
clearing house option, but it could be viable if full computerisation and communication 
facilities were installed in all offices nationwide administering parts of VAT. This is also true in 
the case of intra-state divisions of revenue, such as that currently required in SNNP Region, 
and which, given the political economy constraints, is unlikely to be changed. Any intra-state 
differentials in rate would add significant complexity to the system, however, as merchants 
would need to know the tax rate for each region within the state, as well as the rates for each 
state. 
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7  A path forward 
 
Regional fiscal autonomy, including the adoption of different rates in different subordinate 
jurisdictions, is a feature of several VAT systems that operate at a subordinate level (e.g. the 
EU) or as a surcharge on a federal VAT (e.g. Canada). This has not been a feature of 
Ethiopian VAT, and given the challenges that will be faced implementing any significant 
reform of the current system, it would be most logical not to consider this option at present.  
 
The primary shortcomings of the current system are, first, the limited capacity of tax 
administrations at the lowest level, and the very limited communication between different 
levels of government; and, second, the serious cross-subsidies, particularly from less 
wealthy regional states to wealthier states, which follow the allocation of taxing rights and tax 
revenue on the basis of TIN issuance rather than the place of consumption. In addition to 
limited administrative capacity, the most significant constraint to wholesale reform is that of 
path dependency. It appears to have been an assumption of the legislature, when VAT was 
adopted and assigned to the federal government for legislative purposes, that the division of 
revenue and administration would mirror the systems in place for the earlier sales tax, and 
this is the policy federal agencies and the ministry pursued. The fundamental difference 
between a sales tax and VAT – the deduction for input tax on acquisitions in VAT – appears 
to have been overlooked when the decision was made to allocate revenue on the basis of 
the place of TIN issuance of a business making taxable sales.  
 
Major VAT reform would involve a complete overhaul of the tax administration and system for 
allocating VAT revenue. On the administration side, the federal revenue authority has 
conceded it lacks the capacity and resources to administer the tax at the local level. A full 
reform would thus see the consolidation of local and federal tax officials into a single national 
VAT administration, ensuring full administration of the tax in a comprehensive fashion, with 
full communication and information sharing across all aspects of collection, audit and 
enforcement of the tax. There would be no administrative schisms at state borders, or 
between similar businesses that have adopted different legal forms. On the revenue 
allocation side, the counterproductive cross-subsidies between states, most often from 
poorer to wealthier states, would be eliminated by the adoption of a system that maximises 
gains at a national level, with revenue collected by a single national authority and then 
distributed on the basis of a fiscal equalisation formula or on consumption. Simplicity would 
be achieved by avoiding rate differentials between states, leaving local fiscal differentials to 
be achieved through local taxes on less mobile subjects. 
 
It is difficult to observe evidence of government or sectoral interest or fiscal drivers that might 
prompt wholesale reform of this sort. A far more realistic reform path is one of gradualism, 
which recognises and builds on the path dependency that has shaped the current VAT and 
its predecessor. Federal agencies seem to be comfortable with a division of administrative 
responsibilities based on the legal form of businesses, and with a division of revenue based 
on these forms.  
 
Reform of tax administration can be gradual, commencing with the establishment of an 
administration coordination unit staffed with ERCA and state representatives. They would be 
responsible for overseeing the computerisation of all tax offices, developing communication 
and information exchange channels and processes, as well as joint audit and enforcement 
procedures, to ensure seamless and uniform administration of VAT across all types of 
enterprises and throughout the country.  
 
Reform of the revenue allocation system is more challenging – any change from the existing 
system will produce winners and losers, and the losers under any revised allocation system 
are likely to include wealthier regions that possibly enjoy greater influence over general 
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policy. The Constitution is silent on the allocation of VAT revenue – the only legislative 
measure affecting VAT is the decision of the joint session of the House of Federation and the 
House of People’s Representatives providing the federal government with exclusive power to 
enact VAT law, without mention of the allocation of revenue and administration 
responsibilities. As noted, however, the assumption of the joint sitting was that the 
assignment of taxing rights to the federal government would not alter the fiscal arrangements 
previously in place for sales tax revenue. This assumption was bolstered by the recognition 
in the preamble to the VAT law that the tax was a successor to the sales tax.36 The federal 
government readily acknowledges the precedent of the sales tax, and the expectation that it 
would apply a similar allocation to VAT. Also, the states continue to enjoy significant 
influence over the federal government, in part through their influence over representatives in 
the two houses. 
 
The current system of allocating VAT revenue on the basis of notional place of supply 
(actually place of merchants’ TIN registration) could be replaced with a fiscal equalisation 
distribution or a place of consumption rule that eliminates the interstate and state-federal 
subsidies of the current system, while building on the current regime. Under a fiscal 
equalisation distribution system, all revenue could be reported to a central allocation office in 
MoFEC, which compares net retention in each state with entitlements under this scheme, 
and mandates transfers on a predetermined schedule where necessary. The shift from 
notional place of supply to fiscal equalisation could include transition rules that provide the 
greater of entitlements under the new rule, or the average revenue allocated in the three 
years prior to the shift for a transition period of three years, although this may require a larger 
contribution of federal funds for the transition period. The transitional rules could soften any 
opposition to the change by wealthier states. 
 
In theory, an allocation based on place of consumption could follow the same model, with the 
allocation office using a consumption formula rather than a fiscal equalisation formula. 
Limitations in terms of national consumption data, and, in particular, sub-regional data in the 
case of SNNP Region, probably preclude this approach in practice, however. Slightly more 
cumbersome, but clearly workable, is a central clearing house that could operate in much the 
same fashion, but using information collected from state and federal agencies to allocate 
sales revenue, and input tax deductions appropriately to calculate any transfers that might be 
necessary. Transfers could easily be structured to involve no actual payments by states – in 
most, and possibly all, cases entitlements to more or less revenue could be accomplished by 
way of adjustments of federal transfers to states. 
 
An important goal of the reform process, whichever reform path is followed, is the 
replacement of the current VAT allocation scheme operating in practice with formal 
legislation to ensure one of the most important elements of fiscal federalism in Ethiopia is 
founded on the basis of an adequate legal framework.  
 
 
8  Conclusion 
 
The current system for dual administration of VAT in Ethiopia and the allocation of VAT 
revenue on the basis of the place of supply (determined by the place of a supplier’s TIN 
issuance) is unique in almost all respects. No other federal jurisdiction divides responsibility 
on the basis of the legal form of a business, uses place of supply based on TIN issuance as 
the foundation for division of revenue, and no other federal jurisdiction with VAT-enacting 
                                                 
36  VAT Proclamation No 285/2002. 
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power assigned by law solely to the central government allocates revenue partly to states 
outside of any explicit legislative measures directing it to do so.  
 
Modernisation of the tax administration regime is crucial for fiscal responsibility, and fair and 
efficient collection of revenue is needed to foster economic development in Ethiopia. 
Regardless of what other reforms might be contemplated, attention should be paid to 
information collection and sharing, and joint audit and enforcement activities where 
appropriate.  
 
The choice between revenue distribution based on fiscal equalisation or place of 
consumption is a political judgment based on the government’s vision for fiscal federalism in 
Ethiopia. Workable blueprints for either option are available. 
 
Finally, a revenue allocation system that has evolved without explicit and adequate 
legislative direction should be replaced with one set out in legislation. Fiscal arrangements 
rooted in an explicit and adequate legal framework, including the rules prescribing any 
sharing of revenue between tiers of the government, are a cornerstone of a democratic 
federal state.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 Origin-basis and destination-basis VAT 
 
In the case of international and intra-federation cross-border VAT, revenue is allocated to the 
‘place of taxation’. However, this generic term has two very different meanings. Jurisdictions 
that seek to tax final consumption at the place of final consumption use a ‘destination-basis’ 
VAT, which defines the place of taxation as the place where the final consumption takes 
place. Jurisdictions that seek to tax supplies at the place the supplier is located use an 
‘origin-basis’ VAT. In this system, the place of taxation is determined as the place where the 
supplier is registered or has its tax identification number issued. 
 
Place of taxation 
 
Origin basis     Destination basis 
 
 
Place of supplier Place supplier’s Tax  Place of final consumption 
registration  Identification Number  
(e.g. China)  issued            Determined by          Determined by 
(e.g. Ethiopia)                      national accounts          formula based on 
            (e.g. Canada)         specific place of 
              supply rules 
              (e.g. EU) 
 
All VAT systems operate on a destination basis for international purposes. Under this 
principle, no tax is imposed on exports and all tax incurred on acquisitions used to make 
exports is credited or refunded to the exporter. The exports thus leave the exporting 
jurisdiction free of any taxation. Local VAT is then imposed on the imports in the importing 
jurisdiction.  
 
Within federal states that operate a single national tax, net VAT revenue is collected by the 
national government and distributed to regions using a formula system. Australia, for 
example, distributes all national VAT revenue on the basis of a fiscal equalisation formula.  
 
Within federal systems in which each region is entitled to a share of VAT revenue based on 
actual supplies rather than a portion of the net national revenue, VAT revenue can be 
distributed through origin basis or destination basis. Where the place of taxation is 
determined by reference to the origin-basis principle, it can be the jurisdiction in which the 
supplier is registered for VAT purposes or the place where its TIN was issued (if this is 
different from the VAT registration number).  
 
If the place of taxation is determined by reference to the destination-basis principle, it will 
look to the location at which final consumption take place. This can either be determined by 
using a formula based on national accounts data, or by applying specific destination-basis 
place of taxation rules tailored for each type of supply.  
 
A number of VAT systems use the concept of the place of supply. In these jurisdictions, this 
is usually the place where the supplier is located. This is not synonymous with the place of 
taxation, which is determined by the interaction of VAT rules. For example, in the case of 
exported supplies, the place of supply will be the jurisdiction in which the supplier is located, 
but as a result of the zero rate rules and taxation of import rules, the place of taxation will be 
the jurisdiction in which consumption takes place.  
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Appendix 2 Cross-subsidies under current regime 
 
1. Supplier company in one state to different state customer company 
Supplier company sells for 100 + 15 to customer company 
ERCA allocates .3 x 15 = 4.5 to supplier state 
ERCA allocates .7 x 15 = 10.5 to federal government 
 
Customer company claims an input tax credit (ITC) of 15, reducing its net VAT payable by 
15.  
Customer company state loses 4.5 revenue.  
The tax collected by ERCA from the supplier company is offset by the tax saved by the 
customer company. 
 
The effective subsidy by customer state to supplier state is 4.5. 
There is no subsidy by the customer state to the federal government. 
 
2. Supplier company in one state to different state sole trader 
Supplier company sells for 100 + 15 to customer sole trader 
ERCA allocates .3 x 15 = 4.5 to supplier state 
ERCA allocates .7 x 15 = 10.5 to federal government 
 
Customer sole trader claims an ITC of 15, reducing its net VAT payable by 15.  
Customer sole trader state loses 15. 
 
The effective subsidy by customer sole trader state to supplier company state is 4.5. 
The effective subsidy by customer sole trader state to the federal government is 10.5. 
 
3. Supplier sole trader in one state to different state customer company 
Supplier sole trader sells for 100 + 15 to customer company 
State revenue authority retains 15. 
 
Customer company claims an ITC of 15. 
Customer company state loses .3 x 15 = 4.5 revenue. 
Federal government loses 10.5 revenue 
 
The effective subsidy by customer company state to supplier sole trader state is 4.5. 
The effective subsidy by the federal government to the supplier sole trader state is 10.5. 
 
4. Supplier sole trader in one state to different state sole trader 
Supplier sole trader sells for 100 + 15 to customer sole trader 
Supplier state revenue authority retains 15. 
 
Customer sole trader claims an ITC of 15, reducing its net VAT payable by 15.  
Customer sole trader state loses 15 revenue.  
 
The effective subsidy by customer sole trader state to supplier sole trader state is 15. 
 
5. Supplier company in chartered city to different state company customer 
Supplier company sells for 100 + 15 to customer company 
ERCA allocates 15 to the federal government 
 
Customer company claims an ITC of 15, reducing its net VAT payable by 15.  
Customer company state loses 4.5 revenue. 
Federal government has 15 revenue in chartered city and offsetting credit of 10.5 in 
customer’s state, leaving it with net revenue of 4.5. 
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The effective subsidy by customer state to the federal government is 4.5. 
 
6. Supplier company in chartered city to different state sole trader 
Supplier company sells for 100 + 15 to customer sole trader 
ERCA allocates 15 to federal government 
 
Customer sole trader claims an ITC of 15, reducing its net VAT payable by 15.  
Customer sole trader state loses 15. 
 
The effective subsidy by customer sole trader state to the federal government is 15. 
 
7. Supplier sole trader in chartered city to different state company customer 
Supplier sole trader sells for 100 + 15 to customer company 
ERCA allocates 15 to the chartered city. 
 
Customer company claims an ITC of 15. 
Customer company state loses 4.5. 
Federal government has loses 10.5. 
 
The effective subsidy by company customer state to the chartered city is 4.5. 
The effective subsidy by the federal government to the chartered city is 10.5. 
 
8. Supplier sole trader in chartered city to different state sole trader customer 
Supplier sole trader sells for 100 + 15 to customer sole trader 
ERCA allocates 15 to the chartered city. 
 
Customer sole trader claims an ITC of 15, reducing its net VAT payable by 15.  
Customer sole trader state loses 15 revenue.  
 
The effective subsidy by customer sole trader state to chartered city is 15. 
 
9. Supplier company in a state to chartered city company customer 
Supplier company sells for 100 + 15 to customer company 
ERCA allocates .3 x 15 = 4.5 to supplier company state 
ERCA allocates .7 x 15 = 10.5 to federal government 
 
Customer company claims an ITC of 15, reducing its net VAT payable by 15.  
Federal government loses 15 revenue.  
 
The effective subsidy by federal government to the supplier state is 4.5. 
The 10.5 VAT allocated to the federal government from the supply is offset by the acquisition 
input tax credit claim in the chartered city. 
 
10. Supplier company in state to a chartered city sole trader customer 
Supplier company sells for 100 + 15 to customer sole trader 
ERCA allocates .3 x 15 = 4.5 to supplier state 
ERCA allocates .7 x 15 = 10.5 to federal government 
 
Customer sole trader claims an ITC of 15, reducing its net VAT payable by 15.  
Customer sole trader chartered city loses 15. 
 
The effective subsidy by the chartered city to the supplier company state is 4.5. 
The effective subsidy by the chartered city to the federal government is 10.5. 
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11. Supplier sole trader in a state to a state customer company 
Supplier sole trader sells for 100 + 15 to customer company 
State revenue authority retains 15. 
 
Customer company claims an input tax of 15. 
Federal government loses   .7 x 15 = 10.5.  
 
The effective subsidy by the federal government to the sole trader supplier state is 10.5. 
 
12. Supplier sole trader in a state to a chartered city sole trader customer 
Supplier sole trader sells for 100 + 15 
Supplier sole trader state revenue authority retains 15. 
 
Customer sole trader claims an input tax of 15. 
Chartered city loses 15 revenue. 
 
The effective subsidy by the customer chartered city to the sole trader supplier state is 15. 
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